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Abstract 
 Emergency Management as a field has evolved out of the old civil defense 
programs from the early twentieth century. However, the Twenty-First Century brings 
with it a vast number of new problems beyond the scope of traditional emergency 
management. Fortunately, emergency managers can draw from the civil defense 
foundations to meet growing threats such as those terrorism poses to the population. 
This paper attempts to address many of the issues that arise as emergency 
management is tasked with addressing terrorist threats. In order to better understand 
the dichotomy between Civil Defense and Emergency Management this paper attempts 
to compare the two in order to see which practices are most useful in the new models 
of emergency management and which should be adopted from the old model of civil 
defense.  Some of the issues that are addressed in this paper include governmental 
funding of emergency management, public education in times of disasters, overall 
preparedness efforts, general civilian preparedness, and why emergency management 
is even considered capable of addressing legitimate concerns about terrorist activities in 
the United States.  While this paper focuses primarily on historical aspects of 
emergency management and civil defense it also offers multiple solutions for addressing 
many of the policy shortfalls inherent in the current methodology held by FEMA and the 
Department of Homeland Security.  
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 Emergency management finds its foundations dating back to the early days of 
the First World War. (W. Green)  The overall increase in technology prior to the war 
facilitated the creation of devices such as airplanes and submarines dedicated solely to 
warfare.  Cities and the people who lived in them were finding themselves especially 
vulnerable to attack.  In response to this, many municipalities enacted the first attempts 
at civil defense and preparing the population for the potential of military attack.  In the 
United States, where due to the limited technology of aircraft and submarines, the 
population  was not as threatened, civil defense was placed under the control of the 
Council of National Defense; which was less interested in protecting people against 
military attack and was more concerned with the protection of industry and shipping 
against the potential for sabotage. (W. Green)  At the end of World War I, the Council 
was suspended; however, the multi-level, federal, state, & local, approach that the 
Council implemented would remain indelibly imprinted on the field to present day.  (W. 
Green)  The breakout of the Second World War prompted the United States 
government to bring the council back into service.  However, President Franklin 
Roosevelt assumed that it was too important a task to leave primarily to the state and 
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local councils, and in early 1941, created the Office of Civilian Defense to oversee the 
operations previously under the control of the Council. (Tennesee Emergency 
Management)  The Office of Civilian Defense significantly increased the amount of 
civilian preparation through the Civil Defense Corps, and trained millions of volunteers 
on basic decontamination, first aid, and fire fighting. (Delany)  The success of the Office 
of Civilian Defense would form the basis the Civil Defense Act of 1950 and the changing 
of the Office of Civil Defense into the Federal Civil Defense Administration. (Delany)  
Eventually a long-term plan was enacted, based on the recommendations of the so-
called “Blue Book,” a 162-page manual that outlined a potential model of civil defense, 
one that harkened back to the original multi-level organizational model of the Council of 
National Defense. (Tennesee Emergency Management)  This “Blue Book,” using 
outdated models that were based on major militarized actions, would guide the creation 
and expansion of civil defense programs over the remainder of the twentieth century.  
Many of the programs to come out of “Blue Book” are based on old civil defense 
models, and were included in the scale and scope of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency at its inception during the 1970s. These programs have shaped 
how emergency manager’s deal with disaster situations and are vital to understanding 
the emergency managers response and handling of terrorism and other mass casualty 
incidents. 
 In order to understand how current models dictate the method that emergency 
managers have for addressing terrorism, it becomes vital to understand some truths 
basic to terrorism and terrorist activities.  While no internationally accepted definition of 
Kralicek 4 
 
terrorism is quite adequate to understand the full scale of terrorist activities, for the 
purposes of this paper terrorism will be defined as any action or threat that uses 
violence to influence an audience into action or inaction, most commonly political or 
religious.  While terrorism is not a new phenomenon, terrorism is new to the scope of 
emergency management and is likely to become a growing issue. (Cetron 6) Given its 
similarities in threat scope to military attacks on cities many responsibilities dealing with 
the response and recovery from terrorist attacks has been placed in the hands of 
emergency managers. Prudent emergency managers have begun to focus more on this 
job as all indications are that number and scope of terrorist incidents will increase. One 
key indicator of this is the lessening of violence in Iraq; many of the veterans of the 
insurgency are from outside Iraq and as these veterans return home, they provide a 
growing network of training for future would-be terrorists. (Cetron 9)  Furthermore, this 
threat grows exponentially when faced with the reality that at some point a terrorist 
organization will gain legitimacy. (Cetron 21)  This will inevitably occur when a group 
overthrows, or in some fashion gains control of, a currently vulnerable state. (Janowski 
104)  History has shown this has occurred several times in recent memory: the 
Bolsheviks, Irgun, Svi Haganah, Stern Gang, Fatah, and Hamas have all come to control 
established states at one point in time or another (Cetron 22).  Al Qaida has been 
attempting to regain state sponsorship since the US invaded Afghanistan and has found 
a modicum of success in Somalia, where Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys has gained 
leadership of the Conservative Council of the Islamic Courts, one of the larger groups 
vying for control of the country. (Various)  This is significant because of the fact that 
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Aweys was an associate of Osama Bin Laden throughout the 1990s and went 
underground following the 9/11 attacks only to reappear in Somalia in 2005.  (Various)  
The situation in Somalia points to the possibility of other terrorist organizations 
attempting to destabilize and overthrow other third world nations in a bid to gain 
valuable resources to further their various goals. (Cetron 21)  As many of the most 
devastating weapons of mass destruction require the resources of a nation-state in 
order to be brought to fruition this trend should be of interest to those in the field of 
civil defense.  An even more devastating scenario is one in which a terrorist 
organization gains control of a country that already possesses nuclear technology.  
Several such countries exist in central Asia including Pakistan, Iran, and the former 
Soviet Republics; all are vulnerable to determined actors who seek to gain weapons of 
mass destruction. (Cetron 23-24)  However, not all terrorist organizations seek to gain 
control of nations, or perform actions that will kill thousands of people.  These smaller 
organizations might consist of only a few individuals and are often below the scale of 
international relations, instead attempting to influence general opinion on particular 
topics on a local, regional, or national scale.  Groups similar to past organizations, such 
as the Weather Underground, The Animal/Earth Liberation Front, or the Viper Militia are 
all potential threats to civilian populations and must be included in any serious 
conversations dealing with potential terrorism. This is one area where emergency 
managers must expand their understanding from the old way of thinking about attacks 
that those in the field have inherited from civil defense, since not all attacks on the civil 
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population will be large scale or even deadly, but they still must be addressed in a 
professional manner.  
 Understanding the various groups that are active in terrorism is one part of the 
equation in protecting the civilian population from attack.  Another major part lies in 
understanding the roles assigned to various groups in anti-terrorist responses.  The 
military serves a vital role in inhibiting terrorism directed towards the United States by 
overseas groups; its primary responsibility is to remove the ability of enemies to launch 
strikes against US citizens.  However, the military is not effective against domestic 
terrorism due to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act, leaving the defense of 
civilians to the domestic police and courts. (Trebilcock)  While the shift away from the 
“Root Cause Theory” of police work has been slow to spread across police departments 
throughout the United States, the adoption of several proactive policing techniques will 
give domestic police forces a viable chance to stop terrorist activities before they occur. 
(Howard 5)  The “Broken Windows” approach to policing has been shown to lessen 
severe crimes in New York City, by punishing minor crimes. (Howard 6-7)  The 
consensus is that prosecution of the minor crimes that terrorists use, such as forgery, 
illegal border crossings, and weapons violations, to enable their more serious crimes is 
one such way to stop potential terrorist activities before they can pose a serious threat 
to the civilian population. (Howard 7)  Another important aspect of anti-terrorist 
response is the role that the various intelligence services play in collecting data on 
potential attackers.  These groups arguably serve one of the most important functions 
in stopping terrorist activities before they can prove damaging to United States interests 
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since these groups are able to provide vital information on potential threats to parties 
who are capable of taking action.  Finally, emergency managers are given the task of 
preparing the population for potential attack including mitigation efforts that would 
lessen the severity of attack.  In the event that an incident does occur, the emergency 
manager coordinates response and manages the after effects of the attack according to 
guidelines established by the Federal Government. Emergency managers face a unique 
task in this for several reasons; the first is that terrorism, unlike other incidents that 
emergency managers deal with, is performed intentionally with the objective of causing 
as much damage as possible.  The very nature of terrorism makes planning difficult 
from a mitigation aspect and oftentimes responders will find themselves the targets of 
terrorist actions.  Additionally, emergency managers do not deal with other agencies 
responsible for anti-terrorism activities, excepting maybe the police department, on a 
regular basis, necessitating many new relationships between agencies that were not 
designed to communicate or be compatible originally.  Finally emergency management 
is a field that is viewed as less than priority spending by elected officials, leading to 
emergency management programs often being the most underfunded of all agencies 
tasked with anti-terrorist activities.  This lack of funding is a holdover of bad practices 
that are inherited from the old civil defense programs of the cold war era and if 
continued, will perpetuate a system that is currently inadequate for addressing terrorist 
attacks.  
 In order to understand why this sets up a system that is inadequate for 
addressing the myriad of potential attack methods at the disposal of terrorist groups, it 
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becomes necessary to look at the systems established during the Cold War for 
addressing attacks against the US population.  It is vital to understand that these 
systems, inherited from Cold War thinking, form the foundation of emergency 
management as it exists today.  Following World War II, the primary focus of civil 
defense was to protect the population against nuclear weapons and the aftereffects of 
such devices. (W. Green)  The official policy of the United States and the NATO alliance 
was one of Mutually Assured Destruction, also known as MAD; this policy, also referred 
to as deterrence, relies on the idea that if a full-scale nuclear exchange occurred, then 
all actors would face annihilation. (Gaddis)  This thinking led to the US spending far less 
than many other developed countries on establishing effective civil defense procedures, 
viewing such expenditures as superfluous. (Kearny 6-7)  The Federal Government 
considered establishing a system of bunkers and hardening of systems but deemed it 
too costly, instead deciding on an education program designed to teach people to 
protect themselves until the government could respond. (E. Green)  Remainders of this 
thinking still exist today in warnings for people to keep enough essentials on hand to 
allow them to survive for at least 72 hours in the event of a disaster.  This low-budget 
assured-destruction thought process led the United States to spend roughly $0.75 per 
person on all disaster preparation, including nuclear preparation. (Kearny 6)  When 
compared to European countries such as Switzerland, which spent an estimated $12.50 
per person solely on nuclear preparation during the same period, it becomes easy to 
gain an appreciation for how little actual importance the protection of the civilian 
population held. (Kearny 6)  Additionally, little to no attention was given to potential 
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biological or chemical attacks on the population during this period since it was deemed 
too difficult to deploy such weapons accurately or strategically. (W. Green)  Teaching 
the population to protect themselves until the government could respond would make 
sense except that the governmental plans also assumed that mortality rates would be 
high and any response would be slow in coming. (W. Green)  It was assumed that the 
electromagnetic pulse from detonations would disrupt communication systems and that 
the military would be busy responding to the attackers. (W. Green)  Additionally, it was 
accepted that cities would be the primary targets and that most survivors would be 
those who could escape the cities before the blasts.  Neither of these assumptions hold 
true in other mass casualty incidents (MCI).  The accepted plan for civilians in dealing 
with nuclear attack, that of evacuation of the cities,  also has a negative consequence 
when it comes to economic recovery since most of the industrial centers were 
considered to be targets and abandoning them would have a domino effect on all other 
industries given the interrelatedness of production in the US.  Through examination of 
the evidence it becomes apparent that the government was heavily invested in the idea 
that there would be no recovery from a nuclear exchange and did not see a point in 
funding serious civil defense initiatives other than those designed to promote continuity 
of government. (E. Green)  Given the lack of serious attention or funding given civil 
defense, the likelihood is that the evolution into modern day emergency management is 
also suffering serious flaws in its transition away from a nuclear-centric civil defense 
program into an all-hazards focused emergency management program.   
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 Many of these flaws are seen prevalently throughout the emergency 
management community and can definitely be seen as holdovers from Cold War civil 
defense.  Most striking to an outside observer is the bunker mentality that modern 
emergency management seems to cling to tenaciously.  As Eric Holderman, the Chief 
Architect for a firm that specializes in building Emergency Operations Centers and other 
governmental buildings, remarked, “Emergency Managers are strange animals.  They 
are perhaps the only client that we have to argue with in order to put a window in their 
office.” (Holderman)  This comment is telling of the environment in which emergency 
operations are conducted and is carried out in the most common methods of 
Emergency Operation Center construction and design, primarily that Emergency 
Operations Centers are built more like bunkers than governmental offices. (Holderman)  
Emergency Operation Centers have been built, for the last several decades, primarily 
underground, with no windows and were built with the primary goal of surviving a 
nuclear blast intact. (E. Green)  As a result, security is a secondary or even tertiary 
concern leading to a vulnerability to other incidents that would be just as devastating, 
and carries the potential for failure in continuity of operations.  This focus on bunker 
style Emergency Operation Centers dates back to Cold War Era mentality when all 
levels of government began creating emergency offices in basements, often alongside 
emergency communications centers. (McCool)  While a growing movement is starting to 
move Emergency Operation Centers out of basements and into more secure locations, 
placement of Emergency Operation Centers underground is practice that has continued 
to present day primarily because of bureaucratic inertia. (McCool) This is significant 
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because it shows the difficultly that all levels of government have in moving away from 
certain ways of thinking about civil defense/emergency management programs.  Even 
as useful aspects of civil defense thinking are phased out, deemed unfeasible, or simply 
forgotten, there are aspects, albeit unhealthy ones, of civil defense thought that 
manage to stay within the memory of politicians and decision makers.  
Another issue with the conversion from civil defense to emergency management 
is the lack of standardized training or professional emergency managers.  Instead of 
professional emergency managers, emergency management programs were often 
staffed by volunteers who would also serve other roles in government. (McCool)  This 
harkens back to the block captain model of civil defense, in that oftentimes a person is 
placed in charge of a program with minimal effective training and is only doing it on a 
part time basis, probably because no one else wanted the job.  This leads to a certain 
level of inertia in advancing the field because this person will, more likely than not, 
perform the way his or her predecessor did.  Additionally, this continues a cycle of 
negative interest in the community that equates with fewer funds made available for 
the program.  While many new colligate programs and professional certifications are 
spreading throughout the country, giving needed training and credibility to emergency 
managers, the field itself still is relatively unknown to the general population or even 
elected officials.  One common complaint by emergency managers is that they often 
find themselves having to explain to elected officials exactly what roles and tasks they 
perform in a governmental capacity. (McCool)  This lack of understanding by local or 
state governments coupled with a long-standing unwillingness by federal legislators to 
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provide adequate funding means that emergency management programs become very 
low priority at budget time.  This trend, dating back to Cold War era spending, means 
that emergency managers are often operating with technology that nears obsolescence, 
a mistake that will prove costly in the future as terrorists become more technologically 
savvy.   
The problems and issues thus far discussed, primarily that civil 
defense/emergency management is often attempted with little or no financial backing, 
often using volunteer workers who operate using outdated models of thought about 
attacks on civilians, oftentimes with outdated equipment, are only compounded by the 
expansion of the scope and scale of civil defense into modern emergency management.  
As established earlier, many of the procedures prescribed for nuclear warfare are simply 
transferred over to modern ways of thinking about the various hazards that emergency 
managers may be forced to cope with or that terrorists can devise.  This can lead to 
various issues that might arise since inherent differences exist between nuclear, 
biological, or chemical attacks.  Additionally, much of the philosophy behind nuclear 
detonation survival in the United States since the early 1950s focuses on evacuation of 
the major cities. (Bond)  This ideology continued through the 1980s and into the 1990s 
with the crisis relocation plan. (Cline B-12)  While evacuation plans made sense in the 
earliest days of nuclear weapons, when the primary delivery method was strategic 
bombers, once Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) were invented, evacuation 
became an implausible method to defend the civilian population, having an average 
delivery time of less than 30 minutes. (Agency)  Furthermore, hurricane evacuations 
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have shown the difficulties in evacuation of large-scale cities. (Wolshon 27-34)  The 
problems with evacuation hint at the need to expand decontamination capabilities 
within all major metropolitan areas.  Fortunately, current government officials seem to 
be aware of the failures that current models have in protecting the civilian population 
from attack and are in the process of writing new models. (Bond) This will become even 
more necessary as the facts of terrorism changes and incidents such as the Mumbai 
attacks become more prevalent. (Cetron)  Emergency management, as well as the 
government officials they represent will need to understand that there will be incidents 
where sheltering in place will be the preferred method of coping with the disaster and 
that preparations will need to be made to have supplies close at hand for dispersal to 
the population.  
Understanding gaps and vulnerabilities in the system is one major obstacle to 
overcoming the burdens that are placed on the present by lack of preparedness in the 
past.  As this growing awareness of vulnerabilities in the system reaches the social 
consciousness, the systems and methods of emergency management will invariably be 
forced to change to abandon methodologies of the past in favor of what will prove to be 
the next practices.  Perhaps the most important “next practice” that will need to arise is 
an overall embracing of technological improvements including usage of the internet.  
FEMA does have a website, a distinctly user-unfriendly morass of links and technical 
jargon, neither of which are truthfully useful to a typical American seeking data on how 
to prepare or what to prepare for. (FEMA)  Of the 77 counties in Oklahoma, only eight 
have working websites. (Management)  Given the growing usage of the internet for 
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news and information of events, it seems inconceivable that so few agencies have 
begun effectively utilizing this medium to communicate and educate the population at 
large.  It has become quite evident that terrorists have been using the internet for 
some time now to recruit members, spread propaganda, and teach other would be 
terrorists how to enact various attacks. (group)  Additionally, it currently serves as a 
weapon of mass disruption by allowing unfiltered access to the terrorists target 
audience. (group)  Defusing of propaganda is one area where public information 
officers could become a valuable tool.  By offering opposing information, a public 
information officer would serve to marginalize the message of terrorist groups serving 
to disrupt one of the main goals of terrorism, influencing the audience. (Ooten)   
While embracing the internet is a task which will need to be accomplished with 
some expediency in dealing with the threat of terrorism, or other mass casualty 
incidents, one area that does receive some political and media attention is technology 
which assists interdiction efforts. (Foundation)  Generally, these devices assist in the 
early detection of chemical, biological, or radiological releases into areas.  The 
technology for these devices has improved to the point where they are small enough for 
individuals to carry and use and are easily implemented in any security system for soft 
targets such as schools, shopping malls, sporting events, hotels, and subway stations. 
(Detection)  These five types of soft targets should be especially aware of the likelihood 
of chemical or biological attacks, since they have several of the key requirements to 
make such attacks feasible. (Detection)  Despite knowledge of this vulnerability, it still 
has not been addressed properly due primarily to the lack of funding; many experts see 
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this as a major issue which will likely lead to the vulnerability being exploited by a 
terrorist organization in the future. (Cetron)  Such devices could prove to be incredibly 
useful to managing and controlling the aftereffects of mass casualty incidents by 
allowing for a shift from scene intensive response to an incident level response more 
expeditiously.  These devices would also assist in overall response since it would 
feasibly be possible to position extraction and decontamination teams at local hospitals 
earlier in order to assist with those victims who self-present, creating an overall more 
efficient response. (Scanlon)  Unfortunately, chemical, biological, radiological or 
explosive detection devices are not a priority in civil budgets and instead are viewed 
more as a military expenditure since the military is the primary purchaser of these 
devices.  In 2008, FEMA spent only $6.5 million on radiological preparedness, an 
expenditure that includes detection devices. (FEMA)  Compare this number to the 
nearly $3 billion dollars that the Transportation Safety Authority spent in the same 
period for baggage screening devices and the inadequate scale of expenditure becomes 
apparent. (Office of Management and Budget)  This pigeonholing of expenditure as 
either strictly military or strictly civilian seems likely another holdover from the 
budgetary views of civil defense dating back to the Cold War.   
As our technology improves, our planning and training scenarios will also 
improve.  The probability is that the current planning cycle will undergo alterations as 
computer simulations allow for greater levels of emergency incidents to be simulated 
from start to finish, allowing for real time, or sped up results of different actions to be 
viewed. (Simulation)  One program that is currently available allows for hundreds of 
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users to be logged on at once, creating a real possibility for Fire, Police, Emergency 
Medical Service, Public Works, Community Emergency Response Team, Volunteer 
Organizations Active in Disasters, Emergency Managers, and other decision makers to 
see the simulated results of their actions and how they affect other organizations 
working the same incident. (Simulation)  Such simulations fall outside the current 
exercise cycle, as they are more than tabletops and less than functional exercises.  This 
type of virtual reality simulator is a technology that is currently in use with the military 
and is not deemed important enough for civilian protection despite the practical training 
applications that such devices offer to the first responder culture.   
Useful technologies are not the only victims to budgetary cuts.  Emergency 
management traditionally suffers from lack of funding, and in times of budget 
shortages, an emergency manager can expect his or her budget to be cut even more.  
One area that is no longer a priority in budgets is public education. (FEMA)  This is 
ironic as the public education and awareness campaigns of Cold War civil defense was 
one of the few practices enacted that had a possibility of helping to save lives.  The US 
government has maintained the same policy since the Cold War that people will need to 
fend for themselves for a period before government response will arrive, but no longer 
actively educates the population of this to the same extent as during the cold war.  
While the FEMA website does have some data and information on various types of 
disasters, this data is not very appealing in the presentation to users nor is the 
information often relevant. (FEMA)  The government site Ready.gov has information on 
how to prepare readiness kits and other important information, but recent history, such 
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as the behavior of victims during Hurricane Katrina, has shown that much of the 
population is still painfully unaware that they are expected to fend for themselves 
following a disaster.  If the federal government is going to continue to assert that 
response to any incident will be slow in arriving and that local jurisdictions are to fend 
for themselves, then a public awareness campaign similar to anti-drug messages or 
breast cancer awareness is necessary to ensure maximum preparedness and minimal 
loss of life.  The message must be clear and stated repeatedly that no person should be 
waiting for the government to bring him or her water or other necessities directly 
following a disaster situation.   
Preparedness efforts additionally need to be extended beyond the traditional 
scope of civil defense to include both the private sector and the educational sector.  
One area that would especially benefit from the inclusion of the private sector in 
emergency management would be anti-terrorism.  The current parameters often keep a 
separation between businesses such as private sector information technology firms and 
emergency management.  This lack of shared knowledge between business continuity 
programs and governmental continuity programs greatly affects how emergency 
managers address attacks or even view disasters. (Scheiner)  Emergency managers can 
learn several valuable lessons from the information technology sector and its ongoing 
struggle against hackers including many parallels between the information technology 
managers’ requirements and emergency managers’ requirements.  Both attempt to 
balance security with accessibility, and both are faced with enemies that are persistent 
and increasingly sophisticated in the delivery method of their destructive devices. 
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(Scheiner)  Additionally, examination of the information technology sector reveals a flaw 
in our current funding priorities; often areas that have recently attacked receive a 
majority of the available funds, a classic case of fighting the last war. (Office of 
Management and Budget)  One lesson that should be understood is that an enemy will 
strike locations not where fortifications and preparations exist, but where they do not. 
(Scheiner)  This is something that information technology managers face as a daily 
matter of course; terrorists, like hackers, are searching for vulnerabilities and backdoors 
of which to take advantage.  If a location is secured against an active shooter, a 
terrorist could use a car bomb.  If the location is secured against car bombs by building 
pylons, then a terrorist could still use a rocket-propelled grenade.  If the location is 
made further secure by putting up a chain link fence then the would-be terrorist could 
resort to mailing explosives or strapping on a bomb and martyring themselves.  Attacks 
rarely find themselves repeated the same way because we build up security in the 
previously attacked area and easier vulnerabilities exist to exploit.  While much of this is 
slowly being absorbed into the general emergency management model, thanks in large 
part to a major increase in business continuity programs, it still has a long way to go 
from the militarized plans and thoughts from the early 1950s. 
Another valid reason that the government will need to reach out and establish 
partnerships with the business community is due in large part to the previously 
established desire to evacuate large cities in the face of disasters or attacks, a practice 
shown to date back to Cold War era mentality. (W. Green)  If the governmental 
response is going to achieve this goal successfully, then it becomes vital for public 
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officials to work in concert with the private sector, to ensure that gas stations, grocery 
stores, and hospitals have adequate staffing and goods stocked in order to assure that 
the resources needed for individuals to evacuate are available.  Additionally, the 
reopening of businesses as soon as possible following disasters can dramatically affect 
the quality of life for those who choose to shelter in place or rush to return to their 
homes.  This makes additional sense if the government does accept that there are 
individuals who will simply need to shelter in place as it is likely that at least some of 
those individuals will require access to these services once the threat has passed and it 
is safe to resume operating in the community.  One cold war program that would 
actually be useful in times of disasters other than attacks would be the prepositioning of 
goods and supplies for community use during disasters.  The Federal government does 
this with needed medical supplies in the form of the National Strategic Stockpile, but 
does not see it as necessary to do with bottled water or survival rations.  Just as private 
drug companies manage the strategic stockpile, private companies could manage this 
strategic ration reserve.  
Emergency Management would also greatly benefit from working more closely 
with other sectors such as Universities and the National Guard.  One suggestion that 
would greatly improve national readiness is a requirement that all university graduates 
have certifications in basic first aid.  This would help create a large cadre of potential 
responders to incidents.  This idea is not new to emergency management and was the 
basic idea behind the creation of Community Emergency Response Teams, or CERT; 
however, this would be superior to CERT in that the numbers would be far greater.  
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Since most individuals in a disaster either self-present to hospitals or are initially treated 
and moved to hospitals by those who are not first responders, it would make sense to 
have as large of a portion of the population as possible knowledgeable about first aid 
and capable of making informed decisions. (Scanlon)  Another way that overall 
response could be improved is by moving away from the faulty thinking that serves to 
keep civil governmental agencies from working alongside military groups such as the 
National Guard.  Historically these groups have been left out of disaster planning, which 
has led to conflicts and incompatibilities in systems and procedures.  One example of 
this is the way that MCI triage historically has been done in military training versus that 
done in civil training. (American Medical Association 3)  It was not until the American 
Medical Association did an assessment that showed serious problems inherent in having 
a regional type triage systems that they chose to adopt the military model of triage.  
The acceptance of the military triage model as an overall superior model has created a 
national method of triaging patients and is bringing incompatibility with National Guard 
medical units to an end. (American Medical Association 1-4)  Closer ties with these 
various groups would help to enact a cultural change amongst emergency managers, 
one that would allow for the addition of new thoughts and input on supposed best 
practices and will serve to strengthen the overall preparedness towards potential 
attacks and other hazards.   
To address vulnerabilities to attack in a serious way will take a conscious shift 
from the Cold War era thinking that effective civil defense is something that can be 
accomplished cheaply.  This desire to achieve something for nothing has seriously 
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diminished the capabilities of emergency management agencies to address several 
aspects of the four phases of emergency management, most noticeably those of 
mitigation and recovery.  To a lesser extent, preparedness efforts are affected by the 
lack of funding while response agencies, primarily due to their visibility, have received a 
large amount of what little funding has been made available. (Security) That response 
agencies receive most of the available funding is true even with monies granted 
towards emergency preparedness, such as the emergency management preparedness 
grant program. One area where a sizable financial investment would be extremely 
beneficial is in mitigation.  Mitigation has been shown to be the most cost effective way 
to handle disasters, but more governmental money goes towards response than 
mitigation, a practice that, in the long-term, is less than sustainable. (Security)  In order 
to counter this paradigm, several experts recommend that the government invest $2.5 
billion dollars annually on mitigation projects, roughly what is spent annually by the 
Federal government on response. (Jane Bullock)  These would be funded through 
disaster appropriations, tax-deductible contributions, a disaster stamp, and surcharges 
on flood insurance and other insurance policies.  (Jane Bullock)  This investment would 
go a long way towards lessening the severity of incidents that threaten civil populations, 
thereby saving important resources.   
 Perhaps the greatest payoff for emergency managers would be a reinvestment in 
recovery structure.  The current paradigm relies far too heavily upon the resources and 
knowledge of volunteer organizations that are active in disasters, or VOAD.  While 
VOAD groups offer wonderful assistance for many types of incidents, several indicators 
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show that they are perhaps inadequate for long-term recovery efforts due to the nature 
of such organizations and their funding methods.  If the recovery effort following 
natural disasters, such as what occurred in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina can 
stretch recovery capacity to the point where even four years later the recovery effort is 
being adjusted due to inadequacies, then doubts arise that such organizations are 
capable of dealing with the more serious effects of a chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear, or explosive attack. (Alpert)  Moreover, these groups are not adequately 
trained in hazardous materials cleanup or radiological decontamination, a very real 
concern following an organized attack.  In order to ensure that an adequate number of 
personnel are trained in the necessary skills to ensure a speedy recovery, the United 
States should look to a practice established by the Soviets and carried out by several 
other Asian countries. (Kearny 6-7)  These countries maintain large groups that are 
tasked with decontamination and general recovery efforts following an incident. (Kearny 
6)  If the United States were to create a Federal Recovery Corps, it would greatly 
increase our preparedness for dealing with the consequences of potential attacks as 
well as accidental releases.  Precedence exists for this idea, with a growing usage of 
military troops intervening in disaster situations, and plans to assign a permanent 
contingent of troops stationed within the United States. (Spencer Hsu A01)  This group 
would serve to bolster recovery efforts such as debris removal, hazardous material 
removal, and decontamination of large-scale incidents as well as providing general 
recovery assistance to additional mass casualty incidents.  These changes would 
represent a major shift towards the federal government taking the proactive stance that 
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the current system truthfully demands.  Already we see a shift towards Federal 
awareness of the expected role that civilians demand with the creation of needed, 
prepositioned medical goods, referred to as the Strategic National Stockpile, but this is 
just the beginning of a needed investment in emergency management infrastructure. 
(Control)  
 The challenges that the United States faces in the 21st Century grow 
exponentially as our technological complexity increases.  Nonetheless, these same 
challenges offer us an opportunity to embrace new patterns of thinking and dispose of 
outdated and inadequate models and behaviors.  By recognizing the changing nature of 
international politics with the addition of asymmetric warfare, emergency management 
is better prepared to understand the motivations and probable behavior of terrorist 
organizations, allowing for better preparedness and response capabilities.  By 
recognizing the reality of potential attacks, emergency management is able to do away 
with ridiculous notions such as mutually assured destruction and therefore, will be 
capable of planning for the aftermath of real attacks.  By understanding that real 
problems are inherent in our current systems, we can improve our overall metrics and 
create a better system, designed to respond to mass casualty incidents quickly and 
efficiently.  By understanding that the public needs to be aware of their responsibilities 
before a disaster strikes and implementing a national educational and awareness 
campaign, emergency managers can create a better-informed populace that is capable 
of making informed decisions in times of crises.  By recognizing that important lessons 
can be learned from business continuity professionals, emergency managers can 
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expand their knowledge of enemy behaviors and adopt practices that are more realistic.  
Finally, by understanding that civil defense is vital in an age where a strike on a city can 
occur at any point in time, and offering funding that is consummate with that 
importance, the federal government can serve as the leader during incidents that the 
people require them to be.  These steps would serve to improve our resilience to 
disasters and our capability to recover from events quickly and efficiently.  Emergency 
management needs as a whole to move outside the historical behaviors that have 
existed since the beginning of the discipline and view outside organizations to see if 
they are performing behaviors that would better serve our civil populations.  Over the 
long-term, the willingness to erase the board and start over that will best serve us 
during a period where our enemies consistently re-evaluate their plans and procedures.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kralicek 25 
 
 
Bibliography 
Agency, Military Defense. Balistic Missile Capabiities. April 2009. April 2009 
<http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/bcmt/bm_char_1.htm>. 
Alpert, Bruce. "FEMA streamlines Hurricane Katrina recovery office leadership." The Times‐Picayune 9 
April 2009. 
American Medical Association. Basic Disaster Life Support provider Manual version 2.6. Dallas: American 
Medical Association, 2008. 
Bond, Shannon. "Response plan for nuclear attack has "enormous gaps" officials say." 26 June 2008. 
Medill Reports. March 2009 <http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/washington/news.aspx?id=94439>. 
Cetron, Dr. Marvin J. 55 trends now shaping the future of terrorism. Future Analyses. Washington D.C. : 
Proteus USA, 2008. 
Cline, Francis. "ROUGH HEARING FOR REAGAN 'CRISIS RELOCATION' PLAN." New York Times 17 June 
1982: B‐12. 
Control, Center for Disease. Strategic National Stockpile. April 2009. April 2009 
<http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/>. 
Delany, David. Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. 2004. April 2009 <http://www.enotes.com/major‐acts‐
congress/federal‐civil‐defense‐act>. 
Detection, Smiths. "Smiths Detection Services:Bringing technology to life." International Association of 
Emergency Managers Annual Conference . Kansas City, KS: EMEX 2008, 2008. 
FEMA. "FEMA FY 2008 Budget." 9 March 2007. FEMA.gov. April 2009 
<http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=34749>. 
—. "FEMA.gov." FEMA.gov. april 2009 <www.fema.gov>. 
Foundation, National Science. "Domestic Nuclear Detection Office‐National Science Foundation 
Academic Research Initiative (ARI) ." NSF.gov Funding. Washington DC: National Science Foundation, 
April 2009. 
Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: a critical appraisal of postwar american national security. 
London: Oxford University Press, 1982. 
Green, Eric. Civil Defense Museum . March 2009. April 2009 
<http://www.civildefensemuseum.com/index.html>. 
Kralicek 26 
 
Green, Walter. Electronic Encyclopaedia of Civil Defense and Emergency Management. Richmond, VA, 
August 2003. 
group, SITE intelligence. SITE Intel. April 2009. April 2009 <http://www.siteintelgroup.org/>. 
Holderman, Eric. Chief Architect Joseph Kralicek. December 2008. 
Howard, Dr. Paul. "Hard Won Lessons: How police fight terrorism in the United Kingdom." December 
2004. Manhattan Institute.org. April 2009 <http://www.manhattan‐institute.org/pdf/scr_01.pdf>. 
Jane Bullock, George Haddow. "How the next President of the United States can save FEMA." Journal of 
Emergency Management September/October 2008: 13‐14. 
Janowski, Thomas. The Handbook of Political Sociology . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
Kearny, Cresson. Nuclear War Survival Skills. Cave Junction, Oregon: Oregon Institute of Science and 
Medicine, 2001. 
Management, Oklahoma Emergency. Local Emergency Contacts. April 2009. April 2009 
<http://www.ok.gov/OEM/Additional_Resources/Local_Emergency_Contacts.html>. 
McCool, C. Michael. Director, Tulsa Area Emergency Management Agency Joseph Kralicek. december 
2008. 
Office of Management and Budget. "Department of Homeland Security FY2009 budget." March 2008. 
Whitehouse.gov. April 2009 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/homeland.html>. 
Ooten, Michaelann. Public Information Officer‐ Oklahoma Emergency Management Joseph Kralicek. 
June 2008 . 
Scanlon, Dr. Joseph. Professor Emeritus, Carleton University Joseph Kralicek. 18 November 2008. 
Scheiner, Bruce. Beyond Fear:thinking sensibly about security in an uncertain world. New York: Springer‐
Verlag, 2003. 
Security, Department of Homeland. "EMPG program guidance." november 2008. FEMA.gov. november 
2008 <http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/empg/index.shtm#1>. 
Simulation, ETC. "Virtual Reality Incident Command Team Training." Advanced Disaster Management 
Simulator. Kansas City, KS: EMEX 2008, 2008 . 
Spencer Hsu, Ann Tyson. "Pentagon to Detail Troops to Bolster Domestic Security." Washington Post 1 
December 2008: A01. 
Tennesee Emergency Management. "The History of Civil Defense In tennesee." TNEMA.org. April 2009 
<http://www.tnema.org/Word%20Docs/CD_EM%20Prologue.htm>. 
Kralicek 27 
 
Trebilcock, Craig. "The Myth of Posse Comitatus." October 2000. HomelandSecurity.org. April 2009 
<http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Trebilcock.htm>. 
Various. "Hassan Dahir Aweys." April 2009. Wikipedia.com. April 2009 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hassan_Dahir_Aweys>. 
Wolshon, Brian. "Evacuation Planning and Engineering for Hurricane Katrina." The Bridge (Spring 2006): 
27‐34. 
 
 
 
